WebWe rely on “Bayesian persuasion” to improve deterrence. For simplicity, we focus on the problem of how to allocate resources in order to reduce the extent of illegal parking. … WebJul 1, 2024 · We denominate pure moral hazard the problem in which the principal knows the agent's type and in which the agent's effort level is still unobservable. Formally, the pure moral hazard problem is ... These properties have been studied—often separately—in the Bayesian persuasion literature, where conditions for the optimality of such signals ...
Bayesian Persuasion - American Economic Association
WebWe study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has … WebApr 1, 2024 · We study a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Sender commits to a signal structure, ... With moral hazard in production, the optimal incentive contracts induce efficient production by agents without investment, but the improved productivity of any investment is under-exploited. A better distribution of investment returns can worsen ... lindale new homes
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http://kea.ne.kr/conference-2024/download/S1-1-2_Kyungmin%20Kim.pdf Weblooking-forward persuasion. The delegation mech-anism is formulated in which the agents form be-lief hierarchies due to the persuasion and play a dynamic Bayesian game. We propose a novel ran-domized mechanism, known as Bayesian promised delegation (BPD), in which the periodic incen-tive compatibility is guaranteed by persuasions and http://www.columbia.edu/~ak2912/BP%20with%20private%20info.pdf linda leonard wilson obituary